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WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Government-OPEN MEETING LAW AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVI-
LEGE-Minneapolis Star & Tribune, Co. v. HRA, __ Minn. -, 251
N.W.2d 620 (1976).
In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. HRA, I the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the attorney-client privilege2 was a valid exception to
the Minnesota Open Meeting Law.' As a result of the decision, a public
agency' would not be in violation of the Law when it meets in secret
session with its attorney to discuss pending or prospective litigation.5
The court here developed the reasoning first expressed in dicta in
Channel 10, Inc. v. Independent School District No. 709,1 where the
court analyzed the need for several possible exceptions to the Open
Meeting Law, including one based on the attorney-client privilege. The
Channel 10 court suggested two possible bases for the privileged excep-
tion: the judicial power of the court to regulate the practice of law7 and
the principles of statutory construction.8 The issue, however, was not
resolved in Channel 10 because it had not been litigated in the lower
court and because the supreme court preferred to await "a case with a
more detailed factual setting than is presented by this record."'
In Minneapolis Star & Tribune, the court was presented with such a
case. A reporter for the Minneapolis Star newspaper was denied admis-
sion'0 to a meeting between the Minneapolis Housing and Redevelop-
1. - Minn. - , 251 N.W.2d 620 (1976). The full text of the opinion also appears at
246 N.W.2d 448. However, because the opinion reported at 251 N.W.2d 620 also contains
the order denying the petition for rehearing, it more completely reports the decision of the
court. For this reason, this comment will refer to the text of the opinion as published in
251 N.W.2d 620.
2. See MuIN. STAT. § 595.02(2) (1976) (attorney incompetent to testify about any profes-
sional communications made to client without client's consent). See also id. § 481.06(5)
(attorney's duties include duty to "[k]eep inviolate the confidences of his client").
3. Id. § 471.705.
4. The Open Meeting Law applies to
any state agency, board, commission or department when required or permitted
by law to transact public business in a meeting, and the governing body of any
school district however organized, unorganized territory, county, city, town, or
other public body, and of any committee, subcommittee, board, department or
commission thereof ....
Id. § 471.705(1). However, the Law does not apply to state agencies, boards, or commis-
sions when exercising quasi-judicial powers in disciplinary proceedings. Id.
5. See - Minn. at -, 251 N.W.2d at 626. For a discussion of the limitations of
the court's holding, see notes 54-58 infra and accompanying text.
6. 298 Minn. 306, 215 N.W.2d 814 (1974).
7. Id. at 321-22, 215 N.W.2d at 825.
8. Id. at 322-23, 215 N.W.2d at 826.
9. Id. at 323, 215 N.W.2d at 826.
10. A violation ;f the Minnesota Open Meeting Law requires an express denial of entry;
if the public is aware of the meeting, it is no violation if the agency does not actively solicit
attendance. See Lindahl v. Independent School Dist. No. 306, 270 Minn. 164, 167-68, 133
N.W.2d 23, 26 (1965); In re Minneapolis Area Dev. Corp., 269 Minn. 157, 170, 131 N.W.2d
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ment Authority and its attorney. The purpose of the meeting was to
discuss strategy in litigation then pending in federal district court." The
newspaper commenced an action for injunctive and declaratory relief,'"
and also sought the imposition of civil penalties. The trial court denied
the relief and granted the HRA summary judgment on the grounds that
the attorney-client privilege afforded an exception to the Open Meeting
Law.
The supreme court affirmed. The statute authorizing the attorney-
client privilege, the court held, was not impliedly repealed by the enact-
ment of the Open Meeting Law," which reads in part: "[e]xcept as
otherwise expressly provided by statute, all meetings . . . shall be open
to the public."' 5 The legislature has indicated that it does not intend to
repeal statutes by implication when a newer statute may be found to
be compatible with a prior one.'" The court also found a general legisla-
tive intent to extend the statutory attorney-client privilege to public
agencies as well as to private clients." The court, therefore, sought to
strike a balance between conflicting public interests in preserving the
adversary system of legal representation when the litigant is a public
agency, and preserving the public's right to be informed about the delib-
erations or actions of public agencies."
29, 39 (1964). See also Sullivan v. Credit River Township, 299 Minn. 170, 174-75, 217
N.W.2d 502, 505-06 (1974) (requirement of adequate notice is implicit in the statute
because "[tihe mere fact that the meeting-room door is unlocked is not sufficient compli-
ance with the directive of the statute").
11. The HRA had conducted a similar closed meeting prior to the one from which the
reporter was excluded. - Minn. at __, 251 N.W.2d at 621.
12. Prior to 1973, the Minnesota Open Meeting Law contained no sanctions for its
violation. This prompted the court in Sullivan v. Credit River Township, 299 Minn. 170,
176-77, 217 N.W.2d 502, 507 (1974) (citation omitted) to say "a statute which does not
declare the consequences of a failure to comply may be construed as a directory statute
. . . rather than mandatory. Violation of a directory statute does not result in the invalid-
ity of the action taken." But see Channel 10, Inc. v. Independent School Dist. No. 709,
298 Minn. 306, 317, 215 N.W.2d 814, 823 (1974) (injunctive relief available because absent
enforcement, the statute would be "a mere statement of policy"). The legislature added
sanctions in 1973. See Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 680, § 1, 1973 Minn. Laws 1834 (codified
as MINN. STAT. § 471.705(2)). With the addition of these sanctions, it may be argued that
injunctive relief has been offset by a more appropriate remedy at law. See Channel 10,
Inc. v. Independent School Dist. No. 709, 298 Minn. at 314 & n.4, 315-18, 215 N.W.2d at
821 & n.4, 822-23.
13. See MINN. STAT. § 471.705(2) (1976) (providing for up to a $100 civil penalty for each
violation; if the same person violates the statute three times while employed with one
agency, he "shall forfeit any further right to serve on such governing body ... for a period
of time equal to the term of office [he] was then serving").
14. __ Minn. at -, 251 N.W.2d at 625.
15. MINN. STAT. § 471.705(1) (1976).
16. See id. § 645.39 ("[A] later law shall not be construed to repeal an earlier law
unless the two laws are irreconcilable.").
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The public's right to be informed about the deliberations of public
agencies is of relatively recent origin in Minnesota." The court has noted
that the right is "precious" and the Open Meeting Law should be liber-
ally construed to effect its end: "Unfortunately, our history is replete
with instances of misdirected governmental actions when the people
have not had an opportunity to voice their views in matters of great
public concern."'"
The rule of confidentiality of communication between the attorney
and client is a well-established principle of the adversary system of legal
representation. The Minnesota court has stated this rule is not based
on any particular desire to protect the legal profession, but rather is
founded on considerations of public policy.2' If an attorney is to repre-
sent his client meaningfully, it is absolutely essential that he be in-
formed of all the facts and circumstances of the case. Fear of disclosure
would seriously inhibit communication between the attorney and the
client, thereby adversely affecting the administration of justice.22 The
fact that the client is a public agency should not affect its right to be
protected by this rule. Recognizing that confidentiality between an at-
torney and his client is a basic tenet of the adversary system, the
Minneapolis Star & Tribune court sought to prevent the impairment of
litigation in a situation where, if the privilege was not available to public
agencies, the opposing party would be permitted to attend discussions
between the agency and its attorney concerning strategy in pending
litigation. 23 For example, if the agency and its attorney met in public to
discuss a proposed settlement offer, the opposing party would be able
to attend and discover what strategy was going to be used against him.
The agency, of course, would have no right to attend meetings between
the opposing party and its counsel. The lawsuit, therefore, would be
weighted against the agency, and, because they may be the ultimate
recipients of the fruits of it, or the bearer of its costs, against the public.
By finding the two statutes compatible through the balancing of these
public interests, the court avoided resting its decision upon constitu-
19. The Open Meeting Law was enacted in 1957. See Act of Apr. 27, 1957, ch. 773, § 1,
1957 Minn. Laws 1043 (codified as MINN. STAT. § 471.705). The Minnesota Constitution
does require that sessions of either house of the state legislature be open except when the
members determine that the session requires secrecy. MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
20. Sullivan v. Credit River Township, 299 Minn. 170, 176, 217 N.W.2d 502, 506-07
(1974).
21. See Channel 10, Inc. v. Independent School Dist. No. 709, 298 Minn. 306, 321-22,
215 N.W.2d 814, 825 (1974). See also Struckmeyer v. Lamb, 75 Minn. 366, 77 N.W. 987
(1899).
22. See Channel 10, Inc. v. Independent School Dist. No. 709, 298 Minn. 306, 321-22,
215 N.W.2d 814, 825 (1974); Struckmeyer v. Lamb, 75 Minn. 366, 368, 77 N.W. 987, 988
(1899) (privilege is "absolute necessity").
23. - Minn. at - , 251 N.W.2d at 625.
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tional grounds." Under the Minnesota Constitution, the court is vested
with the exclusive power to administer the practice of law.n The legisla-
ture has recognized this power,2" but is precluded from interfering with
it because of the constitutional separation of powers. If the Open Meet-
ing Law had been an attempt by the legislature to limit the application
of the attorney-client privilege, the court might have struck it down as
an unconstitutional invasion of the judicial power. The court, however,
did not view the issue as one of a threatened usurpation of the judicial
power by the legislature." The question, rather, was how this power of
the court to administer the practice of law was to be applied so as to
balance conflicting public interests.2 9 The imperative issue before the
court was to "determine the proper place and scope of the attorney-
client privilege within the system." 0
By recognizing an attorney-client exception to the Open Meeting
Law, the Minnesota Supreme Court has joined the majority of jurisdic-
tions which have considered the problem. In twenty-three states the
legislatures have written the exception into the statute.3 In three
24. It has been suggested, however, that the effect of the decision was to create a unique
judicial exception to the Open Meeting Law. See Holmes & Graven, Of Open Meeting
Laws, Attorney-Client Privileges and the Government Lawyer, 33 BENcH & B. MINN. 25,
27 (Feb. 1977).
25. See In re Integration of Bar, 216 Minn. 195, 198-200, 12 N.W.2d 515, 517-18 (1943)
(power to regulate legal profession is inherently a judicial power); MINN. CONST. art. VI,
§ 1 (judicial power); id. art. III, § 1 (separation of powers). See also Sharood v. Hatfield,
296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 275 (1973) (holding that a statute which transferred monies
deposited in the supreme court for the regulation of the legal profession into the state's
general fund was unconstitutional as an invasion of the separation of powers).
26. See MINN. STAT. § 480.05 (1976).
27. See Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 275 (1973); MINN. CONST. art.
II,§ I.
28. See - Minn. at -, 251 N.W.2d at 623-24.
29. See id.
30. Id. at __ 251 N.W.2d at 624.
31. See ARiz. REv. STAT. § 38-431.03(A) (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-18a, 1-21
(West Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of July 1, 1977, Pub. Act 77-609, 1977 Conn. Legis.
Serv. 1308 (West); DEL. CODE tit. 29, § 10004(b)(4) (Supp. 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-
3303 (1975); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 92-5(3) (Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, § 42
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); LA. Rxv. STAT. § 42:6.1(A)(2) (West Supp. 1977); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 405(6)(E) (Supp. 1977); MASs. GE. LAws ANN. ch. 30A, § 11B (West
Supp. 1977); id. ch. 34, § 9G; id. ch. 39, § 23B; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.025(2) (Vernon Supp.
1976); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1410(1)(a) (1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-12(b)(7) (West
1976); N.Y. Pus. OFF. LAW § 95(1)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
143.318.3(a)(5) (1974); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G)(3) (Page Supp. 1976); ORE. REv.
STAT. § 192.660(2)(d) (1975); S.C. CODE § 1-20.3(b)(2) (Supp. 1975); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 6252-17, § 2(e) (Vernon Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-4-5(1)(b) (Supp.
1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 313(a)(1) (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 2.1-344(a)(6) (Michie
Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.85(1)(g) (West Supp. 1977); Wvo. STAT. § 9-
692.14(a)(iii) (Supp. 1975).
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states, 2 courts have been asked to rule on the issue and two of them have
found the exception valid. In another, the exception was denied. 3
The Minneapolis Star & Tribune court rejected 35 the reasoning of the
Arkansas court in Laman v. McCord.36 The Arkansas Freedom of Infor-
mation Act lists within it specific exceptions,3 not including an excep-
tion for attorney-client meetings. The Laman court found that the word
"specifically" in the phrase "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically pro-
vided ' 38 preceding the statute referred only to the enumerated excep-
tions. The court narrowly construed the Arkansas attorney-client privi-
lege statute 3 to involve only a mere incompetence on the part of the
attorney to testify about his client's communications. 0 The court held
that the legislative mandate was absolute, and in the words of a concur-
ring justice, "[i]t is not our function to look into the wisdom of this
action or the advisability of the public purpose sought to be accom-
plished."" Thus the court rejected the privilege exception.
In Florida, under an open meeting law which precludes any exceptions
unless provided for in the state constitution,'2 a lower court has found
that the attorney-client privilege affords an exception.' 3 The court
based its decision on the constitutional grant to the Florida Supreme
Court of the exclusive power to discipline attorneys." The Florida Code
of Professional Responsibility, promulgated by the Florida court, re-
quires attorneys to keep inviolate the confidences of their clients. Since
this requirement was set pursuant to the court's constitutional power,
the Florida Legislature may not interfere." If an attorney determines
that he is under an ethical duty to advise or consult privately with an
32. See Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968); Sacramento Newspa-
per Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr.
480 (1968); Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. App. 1969).
33. See Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 263
Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1968); Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d
470 (Fla. App. 1969).
34. See Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968).
35. - Minn. at __, 251 N.W.2d at 625.
36. 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968).
37. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2805 (1968).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 28-601 (Supp. 1975).
40. 245 Ark. at 405, 432 S.W.2d at 756.
41. Id. at 407, 432 S.W.2d at 757 (Fogleman, J., concurring).
42. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011(1) (West 1975).
43. Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470, 475-77 (Fla. App. 1969).
44. Id. at 475. The court divided the privilege into one for the client and one for the
attorney. The public body client has no privilege to claim; the open meeting law acted as
a public waiver of the privilege. But because the legislature may not interfere with an
attorney's ethical responsibility, the attorney may claim his privilege when his obligations
"clearly conflict" with the open meeting law. See id. at 475-76.
45. See id. at 475.
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agency client about pending litigation, the Open Meeting Law does not
operate to interfere with this obligation." Although the Florida Supreme
Court has not ruled on this issue, in another case on different issues 7 it
has indicated it will not sanction exceptions to the Florida Government
in the Sunshine Law unless the exception is explicitly guaranteed by the
state constitution.
48
The Minnesota Supreme Court preferred to follow the reasoning in
Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Board of
Supervisors,49 where "a California appellate court found the California
open meeting law did not repeal by implication the attorney-client priv-
ilege as applied to legislative bodies." Relying upon canons of statutory
construction, the California court found there was a presumption
against repeal by implication unless the statutes in question are so
inconsistent that there is no possibility of concurrent operation, or un-
less there is clear evidence the legislature intended the newer statute to
supersede the older." Finding the two statutes in California "capable of
concurrent operation if the lawyer-client privilege is not over-blown be-
yond its true dimensions," the California court upheld the exception."
The Minnesota court was also concerned with the exception swallow-
ing up the rule. Although it declined to draw more explicit guidelines,
preferring to leave to interested persons such as public officials, media
representatives, and attorneys, the development of informal guide-
lines,53 the court stressed that the privilege did not apply blindly to any
meeting between an agency and its attorney.54 The court emphasized
that the facts in this case were thoroughly considered before arriving at
the decision. The HRA's involvement in "active and immediate litiga-
tion," and the necessity of the meeting in searching for a beneficial
settlement were significant factors.55 In its conclusion, the court stated
that the exception "would almost never extend to the mere request for
general legal advice or opinion by a public body."" In more definite
terms, the court cautioned:57
46. See id. at 475-76.
47. Canney v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 278 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1973). The Canney
court dealt with an exception based on a school board's acting in a quasi-judicial capacity
and found that not to be an exception. See id. at 263.
48. See id. See also Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972) (meetings between
agency and collective bargaining negotiator constitutionally exempt from law).
49. 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1968).
50. Id. at 58, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
51. Id. at 56, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
52. Id. at 58, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
53. - Minn. at - , 251 N.W.2d at 62 (order denying petition for reargument).
Guidelines were recommended in Holmes & Graven, supra note 24, at 29-31. See also id.
at 32-38 (comments of Robert M. Shaw, Dean A. Lund, & Norton L. Armour).
54. - Minn. at - , 251 N.W.2d at 626.
55. Id. at , 251 N.W.2d at 625.
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We cannot emphasize too strongly that should this exception be ap-
plied as a barrier against public access to public affairs, it will not be
tolerated, for this court has consistently emphasized that respect for
and adherence to the First Amendment is absolutely essential to the
continuation of our democratic form of government.
As the court stated in Channel 10, because "[o]pen meeting laws and
their exceptions are a developing field of law," 8 the full application of
the exception for attorney-client meetings will be left to future cases for
development.
Landlord-Tenant Law-THE DUTIES OF A COMMERCIAL LANDLORD TO
INFORM AND PROTECT-Vermes v. American District Telegraph Co.,
Minn. -, 251 N.W.2d 101 (1977).
Vermes v. American District Telegraph Co. I has important ramifica-
tions for Minnesota landlord-tenant law. The case presented questions
about a landlord's duties to protect a tenant from crime and to inform
a prospective commercial tenant of potentially objectionable features of
the premises. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that a landlord has
both these duties.
In 1968, the plaintiff leased space for his jewelry store on the first floor
of a building owned by Apache Corporation. Apache did not disclose to
the plaintiff that an equipment access room was located directly above
the plaintiff's store and that the thin floor of this room formed the
ceiling of the store. This construction design allowed easy entry from
above into the store's vault. In 1971, the store was burglarized. The
illegal entry was made through the insecure ceiling of the vault.
To recover losses sustained from the burglary, the plaintiff brought
suit against Apache Corporation, the original lessor; American District
Telegraph Company (ADT), the installer of the burglar alarm; and the
Towle Company, the subsequent lessor. Using the Minnesota compara-
tive negligence statute,2 the jury allocated fault as follows: Apache,
forty-eight percent; ADT, twenty-five percent; Vermes, seventeen per-
cent; Towle, ten percent. Because the defendant Towle was less negli-
gent than the plaintiff, it was not liable.3 ADT and Apache, however,
were both liable for the losses the plaintiff sustained from the burglary
because the culpability of each exceeded that of the plaintiff.,
58. 298 Minn. at 323, 215 N.W.2d at 826.
1. - Minn. - , 251 N.W.2d 101 (1977).
2. MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1976).
3. See id. § 604.01(1).
4. See - Minn. at __, 251 N.W.2d at 103. The supreme court reversed the judg-
ment of the trial court against ADT. The court held that it was error to submit the
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